Method principles
Principle 1
Start from the affected asset and business service, not from a severity number in isolation.
Principle 2
Keep known exploitation, exploit probability and technical severity as separate signals with separate meanings.
Principle 3
Treat CISA KEV as strong evidence of exploitation in the wild, while still confirming whether the vulnerable product/version affects the organisation.
Principle 4
Treat EPSS as a time-sensitive exploitation-probability signal, not a complete risk score or asset-specific prediction.
Principle 5
Use CVSS to communicate vulnerability characteristics and severity; add threat and environmental context rather than publishing Base score alone as risk.
Principle 6
Record prioritisation decisions with score/source dates, asset context, owner, treatment and exception rationale so the decision can be reviewed later.
Principle 7
Treat remediation as incomplete until the intended change is implemented and the affected scope is validated.
Principle 8
Keep residual exposure, failed/deferred assets and compensating controls visible instead of hiding them behind a closed ticket.
External source notes
Explicit non-claims
- Cybatar does not guarantee discovery of every vulnerability or asset.
- KEV absence does not mean a vulnerability is safe or irrelevant.
- EPSS does not predict whether a specific asset will be exploited and is not a complete risk score.
- CVSS is not by itself a complete organisational risk score.
- Cybatar does not claim FIRST, CISA or NIST certification or endorsement.
- A closed remediation item or passing validation check does not prove the environment is secure.
How to use this methodology
Start with affected assets and business consequence, add observed exploitation and exploit-probability evidence, interpret technical severity in context, assign accountable treatment, then validate closure. Preserve the source and date of time-sensitive signals so later reviewers can understand why the priority changed.